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The Great Return 
The largest number of refugees in 
recent history is waiting on the borders of 
Pakistan and Iran to return home. Over 
five million people wish to return to a 
country devastated by ten years of war. 
Think, if you can, of being a displaced 
person; living outside your own country, 
under conditions that are far below those 
meagre conditions in which you lived 
before; bringing up your family in a situa- 
tion of need and dependence. And the 
prospects of returning to your village? 
Your house and all its contents are 
destroyed, your fields have not been culti- 
vated for ten years, your oxen to plough 
the land have vanished, the school in 
which your children studied is destroyed, 
your neighbours upon whom you 
depended face similar problems or are 
dead, all your savings in terms of cattle, 
livestock, jewelry, or cash are expended. 
And you now need to rebuild all these 
things, but you are destitute. 
What would you do? 
The agency I work for has spent the 
last five years trying to help those who 
wish to stay in Afghanistan. We see suf- 
fering and human degradation through- 
out the country: people surviving well 
past the stage of apparent impossibility. 
Often they must choose the unwanted 
option of becoming refugees. 
Other countries have faced similar 
problems, though never in my experience 
on the scale of Afghanistan. In most other 
countries it has been possible to provide 
assistance packages for human survival, to 
assist people in their own villages. In 
Afghanistan this is not possible in most 
areas. Neither Afghan society nor Afghan 
geography facilitate the introduction of 
internal relief. 
In many, probably most, parts of 
Afghanistan it is geographically, political- 
ly, ethnically, and logistically impossible to 
provide internal relief. Relief agencies, 
bilateral donors, and the UN face a prob- 
lem that has never been faced before. All 
the experience gained in other relief opera- 
tions cannot apply to Afghanistan. We are 
all beginners facing the largest return of 
refugees ever witnessed in this century. In 
addition, we face land mines, the destruc- 
tion of a whole country, destitution 
beyond comprehension - and five million 
refugees. 
What can be done? 
Conceptual Policy 
While there can never be a single 
solution to the problems of Afghanistan, it 
is important to develop an overall strategy. 
Over the past year, especially since the 
signing of the Geneva Accords (April 14, 
1988), a gradual evolution of a policy 
affecting refugee return has been devel- 
oped between relief agencies, bilaterals, 
and the United Nations. 
If it is understood that people cannot 
be assisted in their own country after 
return, the primary objective must be self- 
sufficiency upon return. 
With such a large refugee community, 
it is important to look at the problems 
from a national or macro level. Food pro- 
duction in the country represents close 
equivalency to population. There have 
been some food imports into the country 
over the past ten years, most significantly 
from the Soviet Union, but generally food 
production supports the present popula- 
tion. The resident population cannot 
make up the food deficit for probably 
three years at best, needing a fifty percent 
increase in present production to feed 
those presently outside the country. 
Therefore, if refugee return has to be 
self-reliant, and present food production is 
fifty percent below requirement, a satisfac- 
tory return must be based on an increase 
in national food production. 
Areas of Increased 
Food Production 
Options exist: 
Traditional areas of cultivation can be 
brought back into use. 
New areas of cultivation can be 
developed. 
Disease control can increase yields. 
Pest control can increase yields. 
Increased traction on farms can 
improve production levels. 
Fertilizers can improve yields. 
Improved seeds can improve yields. 
But what do these options mean? 
There are a host of problems that 
affect choices. Without facing these prob- 
lems, some opportunities will not be so 
easy. To list an important few: 
It requires a stable government to intro- 
duce a development strategy that 
would have the resources and skill to 
bring barren land under cultivation. 
Pest and disease control are not tradi- 
tional aspects of Afghan farming, at 
least not to the level required to dra- 
matically affect yields. The use of fer- 
tilizer is a comparatively recent form of 
yield increase in many parts of 
Afghanistan. 
Mechanized traction is also historically 
limited to a few areas of Afghanistan. 
Irrigation systems have been reduced 
by approximately fifty percent over the 
last ten years due to war damage and 
lack of maintenance, and, at the same 
time, antipersonnel mines have been 
sluiced into these irrigation canals by 
rain, hampering rehabilitation work. 
Many of the traditional mirabs, those 
responsible for the distribution of water 
supplies, are refugees. 
The planting seed used at present by 
farmers has suffered by genetic degen- 
eration over the past ten years, and 
most new seed has had insufficient test- 
ing time to be distributed in a whole- 
sale manner until in-country tests have 
provided longer term results. 
Many roads essential for the distribu- 
tion of the required agricultural inputs 
either have never existed, or have been 
damaged and require essential repairs. 
Returning refugees, despite proving 
highly resilient, may need assistance 
between planting and harvesting of 
crops. 
And above and beyond all this, the war 
continues across the country. Indeed, this is 
the most essential point. While the resi- 
dent population is still very much at war, 
and the increased food production for 
returnees has to come from them before a 
refugee return is possible, there can be lit- 
tle hope for a quick return of this vast 
refugee community. 
Despite this gloomy picture, much is 
already being done to prepare 
Afghanistan for at least a limited return of 
refugees. In 1988 approximately US $25 
million went into Afghanistan for relief 
projects through viluntary agencies. 
More and more of this assistance is used 
for irrigation repair and food production 
programmes. In late 1988 UNHCR, under 
the auspices of the UN Coordinator's 
Office (Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan), 
some US $3.5 million were provided to 
experienced relief agencies fo; projects to 
increase food production. 
Feelings and attitudes throughout 
Afghanistan have become more and more 
positive towards rehabilitation, especially 
since the withdrawal of Soviet troops, due 
to the realization that the war might end. 
There have been new allegiances formed 
to create new village or district councils to 
coordinate relief operations. When all 
seemed so difficult, the Afghan approach 
to problems has begunto  overcome 
apparently insurmountable problems once 
again. 
To date there has been very little 
return of the refugee population; indeed 
those who have returned have often been 
forced to leave again because of Afghan 
government shelling or aerial bombings. 
There have been some signs, however, 
that this food production strategy will 
prove realistic and effective. 
In one area near Kandahar, southeast- 
ern Afghanistan, for instance, a small 
p u p  approached our agency asking for 
assistance to repair the irrigation system 
leading to their villages. A group of six 
villages from their area had been aban- 
doned for many years, the whole popula- 
tion having been forced to leave for exile 
in Pakistan mainly because 35 kilometres 
of irrigation channels providing water to 
their areas had been destroyed. 
A group of fifteen families were pro- 
vided tents, as nearly all the houses in the 
area had also been destroyed. A daily 
wage was set (less than th& dollars per 
day) so that this group could start repairs. 
With the assistance of some of our engi- 
neers, they fully repaired the irrigation 
system in a surprisingly short time and 
began planting their first crops. As the 
irrigation system was extended, it became 
possible to cultivate more and more land, 
and a steady trickle of refugees started to 
return. These new arrivals needed no 
assistance, no rations, no cash, nothing. 
Now that they had their land back, and 
food production was possible, they could 
survive. They will, however, receive some 
assistance during this year with seed, 
oxen, and fertilizer, to ensure that the max- 
imum benefit is made of this land. 
In other areas plans or actions are 
under way to repair irrigation, roads, 
bridges, houses, school, and mosques. 
Often just the smallest input from the 
agency is needed to start a whole series of 
reconstruction activities. The relief agen- 
cies are taking the position of catalysts; it 
is up to the Afghans themselves to orga- 
nize the work. The Afghan problem needs 
Afghan solutions; relief agencies must fol- 
low this principal. Indeed, if they do not, 
it is unlikely the Afghans would tolerate 
them for very long. 
These examples may paint too sim- 
plistic and rosy a picture of the solutions 
for Afghanistan. Relief agencies will 
expand greatly this year, with an increase 
in interest and, therefore, funding. 
However, even if all the agencies are put 
together and it would be assumed that all 
their programmes would be successful 
(which is virtually impossible), assistance 
would still reach less than fifteen percent 
of the population. 
What is to be done for the remainder? 
There has been much debate over the past 
months, and as yet no positive consensus 
has been reached. The most likely solution 
may be to provide assistance through the 
private sector. Such a scheme has been 
called "project marketplace". 
Project Marketplace 
This war has damaged almost every 
aspect of the country, but not the private 
trading sector. Apart from paying local 
taxes at mujahidin check posts, the traders 
have been allowed by both sides to cany 
on business pretty much as usual. This 
provides important contacts with parts of 
the country where traditional relief efforts 
would not have access. 
In a situation such as Afghanistan's, 
this presents an unusual opportunity, both 
to relief agencies and especially to UN 
agencies, many of which have mandates 
making such an approach difficult to come 
to terms with. Nevertheless, the UN Co- 
ordinator's Commission requires them to 
look for flexible solutions to difficult prob- 
lems, thus permitting them to consider the 
evolution of the "project marketplace" 
concept. 
Basically, the idea is to encourage the 
private sector, at subsidized rates, to deliv- 
er required commodities to those in need, 
financed through either the sale of ration 
cards or cash for work projects. 
One might ask why the profit motive 
is not working effectively anyway, but 
alternative opportunities and the risks of 
war have excluded some essential parts of 
the market from commodity supply. 
Thus, agricultural wheat threshers are 
being sold for high profits in northern 
Afghanistan, but no food supplies are 
reaching rural amas around Kabul due to 
military and political problems. 
In some form or another, the private 
sector will certainly play an essential role 
in the future economy of Afghanistan and 
thereby assist refugee return. 
There are potential problems, 
nonetheless. Although the importance of 
the private sector is well understood, 
almost all present fuel to feed the delivery 
system comes into Afghanistan from the 
Soviet Union. Without fuel Afghanistan 
cannot survive, but this fuel comes from 
their present-day enemy, a difficult 
dilemma on both sides. 
In many ways it may seem extraordi- 
nary that the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan in the first place, as what little 
Afghanistan had to offer was already com- 
mitted to the Soviet Union under very 
favourable trade terms. There is no appar- 
ent way that Pakistan, or Iran after its 
recent war, can facilitate in any way the 
national fuel requirements for 
Afghanistan. There is unlikely to be any 
logistical or political capacity in either 
country to even ship the fuel, should the 
UN or another donor wish to provide fuel. 
The potential economic and social chaos 
this could cause in Afghanistan cannot be 
underestimated. 
Another serious problem is the 
timetable of a military victory. Kabul is 
the hub of Afghan commerce. Nearly all 
goods at some stage pass through Kabul, 
and from there usually through Jalalabad 
to the south, Kunduz to the north, or 
Herat to the west. Today all these cities 
are involved in military conflict. If these 
essential economic centres are put under 
seige, or are simply inaccessible due to 
military activity, the flow of goods 
throughout Afghanistan will be disrupted, 
except some supplies coming through 
alternative access points fmm Pakistan. 
Some of the important goods urgently 
needed in the future that could well be 
affected by such a situation are fertilizers 
and improved seed, as are threshers, trac- 
tors, and agricultural machinery, all vital 
to food production. Also crucial over the 
next few years will be food supplies of all 
sorts; cement, rebar, and building materi- 
als; oxen, livestock, poultry supplies, ani- 
mal feed, horses, mules - the list is end- 
less. These items not only need to reach 
pre-war requirements, but they are going 
to have to far exceed any previous imports 
to meet present and future reconstruction 
needs. The entrepreneurial skills of the 
Afghans may resolve some of the short- 
falls, but the warning, on a national level, 
is all too apparent. 
Summary 
The scale of the refugee problem in 
Afghanistan is unprecedented. With in- 
country, direct primary assistance impossi- 
ble in many parts of the country, food pm- 
duction is the major objective for the pre- 
sent. Food production, or a return of 
refugees in large numbers, is unlikely until 
there is a political or military solution to 
the continuing war. While much is being 
done already, especially by private volun- 
tary agencies, the scope of the problem 
will require effective solutions from the 
private sector. 
The potential for a worsening situa- 
tion inside Afghanistan cannot be ruled 
out, especially if city sieges become mili- 
tary policy and fuel supplies become 
limited. 
To balance this we can rely on the 
extraordinary resilience and adaptability 
of the Afghan people. 
Interest in Afghanistan is sure to 
decline, especially with the withdrawal of 
the Soviet troops. With the decline in 
interest will come a decline in funding, 
unfortunately just at the time funding will 
be imperative. With so much to accom- 
plish after so much has already been 
khieved, let us hope the opportunity for a 
peaceful and satisfactory resettlement will 
not be abandoned or restricted while so 
many wait for help. 
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